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The architecture and monuments that are one of the products of existing culture 
clearly reflect and define the social reality of the communist and post-communist pe­
riods throughout the regions encompassed by the former Soviet Union. This article 
explores the ideological and political meaning of such architectural forms, an ex­
ploration that supports, in conceptual terms, much recent systematic analysis of the 
interconnectedness rather than the particularities of the three basic social com­
ponents of polity, economy and culture. In this sense, the discussion supports the 
post-Marxist viewpoint, embedded in postmodernism, that conceives a unique role 
for culture in the appraisal of social reality (Lyotard 1984). This perspective directly 
contradicts the theoretical approaches that prevailed from the 1950s through the 
1970s, which analytically distinguished culture as distinct from other societal struc­
tures (Mukherjee 1998).
In this framework, the architectural forms of the communist and post-communist 
periods in the Soviet Union operated as articulated segments of societal structures, 
and thus, played a significant role in holding together configurations of Soviet-type 
societies. As Jameson vividly explains, „No satisfactory model of a given mode of 
production can exist without a theory of the historically and dialectically specific 
and unique role of ’culture’ within it” (1984: XV).
Therefore, this chapter offers an analysis of how architectural forms and monu­
ments can be understood as artifacts that articulate and portray the social, economic
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and political reality of the developing communist society of the Soviet Union from 
its establishment in 1917 to its rupture in 1990. We first provide an analysis of the 
diversified architectural styles in appendage to their personification and reflection of 
social reality of different stages of communist system’s development. We then offer 
some conclusions about the impact of democracy and market economy ideology on 
social reality of post-communism as mirrored by architectural forms.
GENDER IDEOLOGY, MONUMENTS, AND ARCHITECTURE: 
RELATIONAL IDIOMS OF THE SOVIET ERA
One of the most visible reminders of the communist epoch is undoubtedly the ar­
chitecture which accentuated the appearance of Soviet cities for so many years. Re­
gardless of post-communist societal demand for the immediate destruction of such 
monuments, most citizens of the former Soviet Union still live surrounded by com­
munist architectural forms.
Since the 1917 revolution, the Soviet power, striving to realize communist 
utopian ideas of cooperative living arrangements and collectivism, supported artistic 
trends that elaborately glorified the happiness of the masses in drawings, painting, 
sculpture, artistic posters, films, architecture and monuments. In so doing, the re­
gime intentionally promoted desire among the proletariat to be represented in fine 
art and other forms of artistic expression. Architectural forms and monuments con­
structed at that time strongly represented contrasts between the happiness of com­
munist society and the enormity of grief from battles lost to enemies of the people. 
The category of enemy o f  the people was defined both in economic terms as any 
property owners, and in human rights terms as those who advocate individualism, 
human rights, civil liberties and exclusivity of private life. In simple terms, enemies 
were all those groups that did not want to conform to communist ideological 
guidance of to communalism, state control and planned living.
One of the initial strategic goals of the Soviet power was to eliminate privacy in 
social, individual and economic life. Thus, during the first stage of the communist 
revolution (1917 through the early 1920s), the destructive energy of the proletarian 
masses was channeled mainly against the policies of the pre-Revolutionary regime 
and its social institutions. These new post-revolutionary masses were conceptualized 
as a potency of energy, often represented in art and public monuments as super-pro- 
ductive females that, like the mythological images of sacred Mother Earth, were 
steadily giving birth to Gods and titans.
Graphic images celebrating this archetypal female potential for bringing new 
masses to birth were complemented by monuments suggesting the phallic, impreg­
nating male, which, like the mythological Father/Creator, represented how the revo­
lutionary leaders were guiding communist ideology and the collective mind of the 
Party. As a result, Soviet architecture and public monuments acquired a character of
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gender asymmetry: women representing the masses; men representing the political 
power and leadership of the Communist party.
By the late 1920s, as architects began to promote the notion that proletarian 
power could be only expressed and represented by the masses, this elemental ap­
proach to form began to give way to a new movement now called Soviet Modern­
ism. Directly portraying working people rather than archetypes, this movement coin­
cided with the first five-year plan for rebuilding the Soviet industrial centers, and 
intentionally linked architecture/monument design style with ideological shifts.
By way of example, in the late 1920s Kharkov, the capital of the Ukraine and 
one of the biggest industrial and military cities lacking academic or cultural tradi­
tions, was selected to serve as a model city that would demonstrate how workers 
were not only to be organized but to be presented to others as organized by the 
Soviet power. To underscore this political message, alongside tractor and tank- 
building plants, the biggest construction works of the first 5-year plan, the govern­
ment built colossal architectural constructions of iron, concrete and glass in the 
Bauhaus modernist style (ironically borrowed from socialists in noncommunist 
Europe). Among the most sizeable of these was the famous Gosprom-the State In­
dustry Management Office Building, constructed between 1925 to 1929 -  which Ro- 
main Rolland, the famous French writer who visited Kharkov early in the 1930s, 
called an organized mountain. Gosprom, representing the new trend in architecture, 
was at the time of its construction the biggest Ferro-concrete building in Europe. Its 
shape is that of a rising stepped figure, with many assorted verges and surfaces sym­
bolizing rational organization of the masses. The mountain-ridge is reinforced by the 
descending contours of the university and military academy buildings located in a 
semi-circle on the right and left of the Gosprom building itself.
Soviet architectural styles changed again in the 1930s, this time to accommodate 
new groups of communist hard-liners and their political guidance. It was this period 
that saw the culmination of mass repression in the USSR, including the continuation 
of forced collectivization of farms, and, as a result, great famine. The first evidence 
of corresponding change in the architecture of the time was a visible rupture with the 
avant-garde and modernist style of the previous direct representations of the masses. 
Second, most of the new monuments were devoted to the one theme of massive 
statues portraying the leader of the communist masses -  Joseph Stalin. Third, a ten­
dency emerged to connect art with functionalism in the architectural styles ex­
pressed in the construction of such buildings as the Moscow Metro, the Communist 
Party and military headquarters, and high buildings in both the center of Moscow 
and the capitals of other USSR republics. Each of these buildings was designed to 
serve not only an administrative or production function but also as a massive public 
monument, crowned with large-sized figures whose very mass and power would im­
print the readiness of working masses to sacrifice themselves to phallic communist 
utopia.
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A good example of this style is the well-known Kharkov monument of Taras 
Shevchenko (build in 1935), which presents a figure of the poet on a pedestal, sur­
rounded by a spirally-arranged sculptural ensemble that includes three female and 
thirteen male figures. The characters of the ensemble symbolize the history of the 
struggle of the Ukrainian people, women and men alike, against oppression.
The three female figures, who represent the various stages of the process of radi­
cal transformation for Ukrainian woman, are particularly prominent. Two of them 
are placed below the pedestal, where they eloquently speak for the sufferings of Uk­
rainian people in pre-Revolutionary times. The first figure is the „mother-pokrytka” 
(covering/hiding) with her illegally borne child, a frequent female image found in 
Taras Shevchenko’s poetry. The second is a woman-peasant doing her serf obliga­
tion work at panschina. The third female image, prominently figured at the top of the 
monument, represents the new generation of Ukrainian women: the Soviet woman, 
worker and Komsomol member. Her position at the pinnacle of the monument sym­
bolizes the feeling of joy and happiness of Ukrainian workers within the new social­
ist society. The mimicry and poses of female images in the Shevchenko monument, 
like other sculptures of Stalinist times, thus illuminate by juxtaposition the division 
between, on one hand, the deepest of people’s sufferings, the torments caused by op­
pression and aggression prior to the communist period, and on the other, the feelings 
of supreme joy and enthusiasm of the communist masses.
The male figures in the ensemble serve as links between woman’s terrible past 
with her promising future. These thirteen figures are massively male, positioned 
physically between the women, as if to fill in the gapi between the past and present 
of woman’s status, and to express through their bodily postures their determination 
to sacrifice themselves for the new political system.
Interruption of Soviet societal life by the Second World War, post-war involve­
ment in border disputes and discourse regarding internal political structures of 
neighboring countries diverted Soviet leaders’ attention away from internal politics 
and toward external affairs. One of the consequences of this political turmoil was 
relative stability in architectural trends of that time. During the 1950s through 1980s, 
the period following Stalin’s death and subsequent softening of the communist reg­
ime, Soviet architecture reflects the ideological shifts that characterized that time. In 
the earlier period, the focus had been the dictatorship of workers initially presumed 
essential for establishing a communist system. Now, the dominant ideology called 
for emphasizing the achievement of the communist regime in terms of developed 
rather than emergent socialism. The images of the proletariat, the joyful victims, 
sacrificing themselves for the good of others gave way to a festive style expressive 
of an epoch of fully-developed socialism. The main theme portrayed in architecture 
and monuments of this time was that of workers not only desiring to support of the 
programs and policies of the communist leaders but also courageously withstanding 
all failures to realize the new regime’s full potential.
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It was at this time, in the end of 1970s, that Soviet architecture created its 
apotheosis in the most significant Kharkov monument of the Soviet period: the 
monument to Lenin, constructed in Svoboda Square. From the ground level one 
sees, on the right and left of the monument’s base, a bas-relief depicting the contours 
of one female and five male figures. The details of faces and clothing are not as pre­
cise as those of the figures of the Shevchenko monument, but the figures themselves 
similarly symbolize the people’s struggle against capitalistic oppression prior to the 
communist revolution. In the Lenin monument’s case, however, their primary pur­
pose lies less in what they themselves symbolize but in how they serve as a founda­
tion for the phallic figures of the leaders of the communist revolution, embodied 
here in Lenin himself.
Ironically, at the same time that the Lenin monument celebrated communist 
leadership built on the committed backs of the people, other artists began to privi­
lege attention to the base itself as significant in its own right. In a monument built 
about the same time -  the Heroes of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 -  for ex­
ample, it is the base in itself that expresses communist ideology. This monument, 
one of the last large monuments of the Soviet era, was built in the central part of 
Kharkov, in Sovietskaia Square (now Constitution Square). It consists entirely of a 
granite block base in the shape of an irregular parallel-piped. Around this base are 
five figures representing the heroes of the Ukrainian revolution -  three workers (in­
cluding a farm worker), a soldier and a salesman -  but no leader: the space above 
the base is empty. The monument is thus in actuality, and powerfully, an empty 
pedestal, which contemporary Kharkovites describe ironically, with characteristic 
post-Soviet humor as Five o f  them are carrying a refrigerator.
At this same time, when leaderless pedestals suggested a shift in perception 
about the relationship of the people to the state, some Soviet architecture focused 
more specifically on representing issues of the people’s rights. One example of this 
is a set of monuments (in Tibilissi, for example, which portrays a powerful Mother 
Georgia looking protectively out over the city) supposedly celebrating women’s 
political rights and their participation in social, economic and political structures 
such as people’s councils, committees of trade unions and congresses of the Com­
munist party. Like the empty pedestal, however, such monuments speak more of 
irony than reality. While it was true that the overall representation of Soviet women 
in political institutions was much higher than that of women in Western parliamen­
tary structures, very few women actually held positions at the highest levels of the 
decision-making political structures, such as the Politburo, the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party or Ministries. Most of the women representatives served only 
on the lowest levels of the nomenclature, where they reached up to 30 percent of the 
total number of members of the lower administration. Thus, while public monu­
ments might try to praise the progress of women toward equality, such repre­
sentations of gender equality were more faade than real -  just as publicly promoted 
strategies of gender equality were more democratic-appearing facades of an other­
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wise totalitarian regime than real attempts to establish or promote equality, civil and 
democratic rights, or to include a broader spectrum of society’s representatives into 
local and national governing assemblies.
ARCHITECTURE OF THE POST-SOVIET ERA
Since the collapse of the USSR no new monuments that symbolize general com­
munist ideology have been constructed. On the contrary, in many Soviet cities com­
munist monuments have been demolished.
The scope of the destruction of monuments varies between republics and their ci­
ties. For example, in general in the Ukraine most remaining Soviet-period monu­
ments have been destroyed, but in Kharkov, site of so many of the previous regime’s 
symbolic monuments, only one has been shattered: that of Dzerzhinskiy, the first 
chief of the Extraordinary Committee that proceeded the Soviet Security Forces 
(KGB), located in front of the Metro Station. Furthermore, also in Kharkov, the 
post-perestroika period saw the construction of a huge, communist-style monument 
of Marshal Zhukov, a famous Soviet commander in the Second World War, in one 
of city’s central squares, [the Prospect of 50th Anniversary of the USSR]. This con­
struction raises questions about whether the state authorities may remain more am­
bivalent with respect to the former Soviet traditions than more recently proclaimed 
desires to gain a new democratic image of the independent nation state would sug­
gest.
Since this last monument of Zhukov, no monuments have been constructed for 
or about the masses in any other Ukrainian city. This reflects the very real changes 
that have occurred in the character of the proletariat, who -  no longer blindly follow­
ing the communist leaders, relying on their help in every aspect of life -  are now in­
dependent, self-organized survivors in the initiated market economy system. The 
new masses have gone through proletariat dictatorship, developed socialism and the 
collapse of the USSR. They are no longer killed, nor put in prisons, camps or psy­
chiatric clinics. They may often be impoverished, but they are also victorious over 
the former monopoly of a totalitarian communist regime that had unlimited control 
and hegemonic decision-making power over all issues of life and death for its citi­
zens.
The new masses no longer desire to be glorified in monuments or to accommo­
date themselves to communist ideology. Their primary concern is participation in 
and adaptation to new economic structures (Baev 1995). Hence, the role of public 
monuments is being replaced by functional architectural constructions designated to 
serve consumer needs of the people living in the post-perestroika period of transition 
to the market economy.
Since the early 1990s, architectural developments no longer emphasize construc­
tion of the large-size industrial plants and Party headquarters or other political insti-
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tutions’ buildings which typified the architecture of the Soviet period. Rather than 
embodying the previous ideological propaganda about the greatness of communist 
society, the focus of post-Soviet architecture now emphasizes consumerism, com­
mercialism, private ownership and societal wealth. New commercial buildings, such 
as banks, private offices and small luxury shops for the newly rich post-Soviet socie­
ties, are copies of contemporary Western European and American architectural 
styles. Moreover, many of the old residences that used to belong to aristocratic fami­
lies prior to the revolution are being renovated in central cities of the former Soviet 
Union (e.g., Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev and Kharkov).
But most visible of all, especially during the first years of the post-communist 
period, are new shopping places, geared to accommodating new consumers’ needs. 
Along with exclusive, luxury shops are mushrooming market places for the working 
masses, the bazaars. Unlike the luxurious stores mirroring Western cultural images, 
these bazaars have a distinct style that is worth serious attention.
Initially, just after the collapse of the communist regime, bazaars consisted of 
miniature trading posts or booths where tradesmen, placing clothes, cosmetics or 
other consumer or food products directly on pavements on blankets, small portable 
tables or on chairs, tried to sell their goods to passers-by. Most such bazaars were lo­
cated on main streets and squares, or in front of public places with heavy pedestrian 
traffic, such as train, metro and bus stations or large stores. The most common archi­
tectural forms prevailing in every city’s central streets and traffic arteries, the 
functional purpose of bazaars was to provide public spaces for non-formal business 
transactions. Given their enormous numbers, however, such bazaars can be also seen 
as a kind of architectural monument that functions similarly to those of the Soviet 
years, redecorating cities to reflect the changing ideologies and values of the new 
era.
Initially, after the collapse of the Soviet state, the bazaars sprang up spon­
taneously, when a lot of people who had lost state jobs started to sell food and sec­
ond-hand goods wherever it was possible to find potential buyers. By the mid- 
1990s, city authorities began to take control over bazaar activity and development, 
regulating their spread and controlling income acquired from sales by its taxation. 
As part of such new regulations, bazaar owners were now required to get permis­
sion, or a formal license, to establish a bazaar, and hence to be registered as a bazaar 
owner. The registered bazaars were allowed to be placed in cities as more permanent 
constructions, characterized by roofs, walls and counters similar to newsstands. 
Sometimes they were separated from the street or sidewalk by a fence. Atypical in 
communist countries, these new architectural forms now widely decorate post-com­
munist cities.
As more permissions were issued, creating more such structures taking up more 
space within cities themselves, some bazaars were moved outside the city limits to 
specially designated fenced-off squares. These new spaces, similar to American flea- 
markets, are characterized by rows of trading booths arranged in geometrical order
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with on office building designated for city managers of the property, and for militia 
that execute control over sales’ taxation and can confiscate goods or issue fines if 
proof of paid taxes is not presented.
From a distance, these bazaars resemble besieged forts, an image which in actu­
ality comes close to a kind of truth. In fact, due to an atmosphere of fear, the uncer­
tainty of tax inspections, militia, and the possibility of fines and confiscations, 
bazaars have indeed become kinds of forts, not keeping danger out but containing it 
by providing parameters that can be more readily controlled. In other words, bazaars 
are forts where the enemies do not stand outside the walls but rather penetrate in­
side, fueling an atmosphere of threat and fear. Within the limited space that the 
newly-constructed bazaars provide, executing control over non-formal trade transac­
tions is easier and quicker for the new state regime.
An extension of bazaars particularly worth noting are trading posts operated by 
shuttles, or Chelnocks in Russian (Morvant 1995). The name is a slang word for a 
person who is working as a seller at a big market (a post-Soviet outdoor shopping 
center) who at times travels to neighboring countries such as Turkey or Poland to 
purchase more goods. The shuttles’ posts are similar to the initial bazaars that 
emerged within cities, with goods exposed on blankets and a tradeperson standing 
by, but with a difference: Rather than respected entrepreneurs, shuttle sellers carry a 
negative image of an impoverished, dishonest beggar more than that of an honest 
salesman, and most of them are women. The shuttles are legally permitted to sell 
goods only within the limits of bazaars, and are prime targets for taxation.
On the radio, tradesmen are constantly reminded about their liability for breaking 
the rules of trade and tax legislation which, with time, have become more rigid and 
often confusing, as double tax systems and regulations reversing prior rules become 
more frequent. In other words, the bazaars that were spontaneously established to 
the secure financial needs of workers released from work within the Soviet control­
led economy -  and which are spontaneous expressions of adaptation to the new 
market economy -  are now becoming targets of local government control. In Michel 
Foucault’s words, the totalitarian repression has acquired a form of biopower of bio­
logical survival finally beyond gender codes of phallic” and/or female” (in Rabinów 
1991:257).
The harsher restrictions placed on shuttle operators as compared to bazaar opera­
tors take the form of more parsimonious scrutiny (and control) of their trading ac­
tivities, and more frequent control of their tax liabilities. Such discriminatory treat­
ment reinforces the negative image of shuttles, vividly portraying the role that 
gender plays in acceptance of entrepreneurial pursuits. In contrast to bazaar opera­
tors, who are predominantly male, the shuttles are mostly women, and this gender 
distinction fuels differential images, of men’s and women’s entrepreneurial skills 
and abilities.
The post-communist symbolic portrayal of women has changed a great deal 
since communist times. In architectural iconography she is no longer referred to as a
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Motherland, a hero Woman-Worker and a hero Woman-Peasant. Two emerging 
symbolic presentations of women include the historical symbol of Bereginia, the 
feminine keeper of Ukrainian hearth and home, as now the owners of the marginal, 
publicly criticized shuttles. These new female symbols bear little or no relation to 
the mystery of femininity so glorified by pre-communist as well as communist 
iconography. They also suggest, particularly in the social architecture of the shuttle, 
that the social-economic status of post-Soviet women, who receive scanty pensions 
or eke out livings through shuttle management, represent the highest percentage of 
those suffering the severest financial deprivation.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
As noted, the politics of architecture and the architecture of politics within the 
communist period went through a number of transformations with respect to the re­
lationships of style, form and functionality to ideological messages intended to con­
vince both Soviet citizens and the outside Western world that Soviet communism 
embodied great Truths—particularly about the revered role of proletariat in a com­
munist society. Such old symbolic representations of proletariat power, replete with 
obedience to the guidance of the Communist party and political leaders, no longer 
hold in the post-communist time, but no new politic of architecture has yet emerged 
to take its place.
The visible architectural forms of newly built banks, shops and commercial 
places, trading booths and bazaars, however, may play a disturbingly similar role to 
that played by architectural monuments during communism. On one hand, they sym­
bolically deliver a message to former Soviet citizens and to the outside world that 
post-Soviet society is indeed changing its priorities and values. But, just as the pre­
vious era’s monuments symbolized proletarian obedience to communist political 
power, so the commercialized architectural forms of post-communist society may 
embody a new set of Westernized values, such as individualism, materialism and 
consumerism. If so, the new politics of architecture may represent less an engage­
ment with democracy than a shift of proletarian obedience from one master to 
another: from communist political power to the new macro-structures of a market 
economy.
Regardless of political connotations and the impact of diverse systems of com­
munism and post-communism, the description of the politic of architecture provides 
vital evidence that „the evaluation of the cardinal valuation of humankind in any 
configuration of human society, at any point in time, is internalized and registered 
by its culture” (Mukherjee 1998: 40). But it also suggests the importance of broader 
structural relations between institutional structures of polity, economy and culture, 
and an exegetic expression of biases toward minorities that protrude ideological
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statements communicated within, and through, cultural artifacts and political ideo­
logy.
The latter points to the interconnectedness of culture with political and economic 
spheres, and to the interaction of new cultural images with the social stratification 
system, an argument that has received insufficient attention in studies on post-com­
munist transitions. Although much more research on this theoretical proposition is 
needed, this discussion illustrates that a broad array of variables can significantly in­
fluence the societal internalization of reality, and calls potential researchers to 
further investigate this problem. If future analyses are conducted, such an integrated 
view will add to the understanding and measurement of democratization processes, 
and potentially lead to parsimonious accounts of their outcomes.
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